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Management Entrenchment in the Market
for Corporate Control
Ken C. Yook and George M. McCabe
Acquisitions have become
a major growth strategy during
the last couple of decades.
Although almost all acquiring
companies allege creation of
value for their shareholders is
the driving motive for their
acquisition attempts, most
acquiring companies failed to




money on announcement of
acquisitions,1 and the
company’s post-acquisition
performance is not improved.2
Acquired companies are often
resold later for a discount.
Despite clear evidence of
losses in shareholder wealth,
companies continue making
more deals and bigger deals. It
appears that
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1979 and 1990 and found
that two-thirds of them
destroyed shareholder value,
largely because of unfulfilled
expectations from synergies
compared to huge premiums
paid to target companies.
Hayward and Hambrick
(1997) report premiums
averaged 41 percent between
1976 and 1990. Although
acquiring companies always
claim the value of synergy
extracted from the acquisition
will be more than the
premium, evidence shows the
the larger the premium paid,
the greater the risk of
destroying shareholder
wealth.3 Then, why do
acquiring companies fail to
learn from experience and
continue to pay excessive
premium. There are several
possible answers to this
question. 
Since value created by
acquisitions mostly ends up in
the hands of target
shareholders, one theory is
that firms suffer from a
particular type of estimation
error termed the winner’s
curse. This theory is rigorously
developed in what are called
first-price sealed-bid common
value auctions. In these
auctions the item being
auctioned has a single value
common to all bidders who
submit sealed bids with the
item being awarded to the
highest (first price) bidder.
The idea of the winner’s curse
is that the item has a true (but
unknown) value common to all
bidders and each bidder
somehow obtains an estimate
that is unbiased in the sense
that its expected value is equal
to the true value; however,
given that bidders bid their
estimates or something close
to them, the winning bidder is
likely to be the one with the
highest estimate of value. In
order words, each bid will
have an expected value equal
to the true value but the
winning bid will be the one
that most overestimates the
value of the item (even if all
bidders make individually
unbiased estimates) so the
winner is likely to incur losses
or suffer the winner’s curse.
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Statistically the expected value
of each bid is the true value,
but the conditional expected
value of each bid (conditional
on it being the winning or
highest bid) is likely to exceed
the true value.
A problem with this
explanation is that the
takeover market differs from
the auctions where the
winner’s curse theory was first
developed. First, it is not
typically a sealed bid auction
and bids are public
information. It is more
analogous to an English (or
open or ascending-bid) auction
than it is to the first price
sealed bid auctions of the
winner’s curse literature.
Second, there is a private
value component in the
auction. A target company’s
value is not common to all
bidders. Each bidder has an
estimate of value that has both
common and private value
elements. We view the market
for corporate control as an
auction market with a high
reservation price. Unless there
is a bid above the reservation
price current owners keep
their firm. To bid then, a
bidder must feel there are
some synergies that make the
firm more valuable to them or
that current owners have
mismanaged the firm or that
capital markets have
erroneously undervalued the
firm. In most cases bidders
will see the reservation price
as too high and there will be
no bid. This is in line with our
casual observations. Despite
all of the publicity given to
takeovers most firms receive
no bids at all; their reservation
prices (current market values)
are simply too high. All
potential bidders have
estimates of value but only
those bidders who have an
estimate of value above the
reservation price actually bid. 
 While the tendency may
not be as strong as in a pure
common value setting it seems
clear that the bidder which
most overestimates the
synergy is most likely to have
the highest estimate of value.
Roll’s hubris theory asserts
managers suffer from hubris
and simply overestimate their
ability to manage the
combined firm and/or achieve
synergies from the acquisition
(Roll, 1986). Academics and
practitioners argue that hubris
is manifested in overconfident
corporate executives who
assume they will be able to
overcome existing
management mediocrity and
improve performance of target
firms. Hayward and Hambrick
(1997) constructed a CEO





They showed that this index
was able to predict the size of
takeover premium. In short,
over-enthusiasm or poor
judgement on the part of
bidder’s management is apt to
cause overpayments. The
hubris argument implies that
although the corporate
takeover market differs from
the common value auction
market, the net outcomes are
essentially similar to the
winner’s curse theory; winners
suffer losses.
Theoretically, even if
managers are overconfident in
their abilities, they do not
need to overbid target firms as
they pursue the goal of
shareholder wealth
maximization. The same
strategies developed to counter
the winner’s curse are applied
here. In essence, they
recognize the size of a bid does
not matter, if it is not the
winning bid (i.e., losing
bidders pay nothing) and that
the winner is likely to have the
highest estimate of value that,
as argued above, tends to
overstate the true value.
Accordingly, each bidder
should presume his own
estimate of the item’s value is
the highest estimate and try to
scale it down.4
Further, private value
component in the takeover
market helps prevent the
winner’s curse. Acceptance of
a bid in common value
auctions is an informative
event because the seller knows
the true value and failure to
incorporate this contingent
information into the bidding
strategy can lead to the
winner’s curse. However, a
bid in a takeover market is not
an informative event because
the target does not know its
true value to a bidder, and
synergy may differ across
bidders. Therefore, in this
type of auction, bidders do not
need to make excessively high
bids, at least initially. Bidders
observe rival bids and if they
choose, may revise their own
bids. Thus, the dominant
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strategy would appear to be
start with a low bid and raise
it only in response to target
companies and rival bids until
the bid reaches one’s estimate
of value or the auction is won.
This type of behavior is what
Daniel and Hirshleifer (1995)
term ratchet behavior. But this




frequently, however, offer high
premiums on their initial bids,
rather than making a low bid
and being prepared to raise it
if there is competition (p.
88).” Daniel and Hirshleifer
cite a Wall Street Journal
article entitled “Whopping
Initial Bids Become Trend of
90’s” (p. 1). So in viewing the
market for corporate control
not only was the winner’s
curse observed, also the large
premiums typically occur at
the initial bid. This
phenomenon extends well
beyond the simple prediction
that acquiring companies
overpay because of a winner’s
curse or hubris in a bidding
auction. 
How can this phenomenon
that bidders make excessively
high initial bids for already
existing assets and tech-
nologies and consistently
suffer losses be explained?
There are two strands of
literature that may help
explain this phenomenon. One
is the managerial entrench-
ment theory (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1989; Edlin &
Stiglitz, 1995). Managers
develop firm-specific human
capital over time, making
them more productive inside
the company than outside it.
Managerial rents equal the
difference between their value
to the firm and their labor
market value (opportunity
costs). By choosing to invest in
projects that need their
expertise and private
information, even if the
projects have negative net
present values, managers can
effectively increase their firm-
specific human capital and
managerial rents. Managers
can entrench themselves by
making manager-specific
investments that make it
costly for shareholders to
replace them.6 Acquisitions are
an easy route for obtaining
such projects, because making
a successful acquisition is a
dynamic process, which
requires a great deal of
executives’ firm-specific
human capital. Therefore, this
theory implies the value of a
target company to a bidding
company (at least to the
management) includes
managerial rents the bidding
company management can
extract from the target
company once it is properly
controlled. Accordingly,
executives who expect to
derive large managerial rents
are willing to pay more than




models in costly sequential bid
auctions in the context of
private values auctions (Fish-
man, 1988; Bhattacharyya,
1992; Daniel & Hirshleifer,
1995). This world where
bidders are uncertain about
the values other potential
bidders would attach to the
target and where they bid to
deter these other bidders, ends
up having quite similar to the
sealed bid auction where the
winner’s curse theory was
originally developed. There are
two ways a bidder wins a
bidding contest for a target
company. First, in the ratchet
scenario bidding precedes in a
ratchet fashion with each
bidder raising his bid
incrementally above the others
bid until as in the standard
theory of English auctions the
higher value bidder wins with
a bid equal to the second
highest valuation. Second, in
the signaling scenario first
bidders are motivated to bid
high to signal a high valuation
and deter second bidders from
bidding. The key to this
scenario is that bids are costly
and second bidders see their
expected profit as a declining
function of the first bidder’s
value.7 When a second bidder
observes a high first bid he
infers an estimate of valuation
for the first bidder. If the
inferred valuation is higher
than his valuation, he drops
out rather than incur the cost
of bidding. In general with this
strategy it may be possible for
the first bidder to gain more
(or lose less) by winning at an
initial high bid than by
bidding low initially and then
incrementally raising his bid in
response to other bids. 
As the authors observed
that a majority of acquisitions
are not contested, i.e., a single
bidder for each target
company, it appears that
bidders perceive that they gain
more (or suffer less losses) by
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initially bidding well above the
reservation price in an attempt
to deter other bidders. Even
though the managerial
entrenchment theory predicts
negative market reaction to
takeover announcements,
preemptive initial bids may
still be an efficient bidding
strategy to minimize losses. 
This bidding strategy
based on the managerial
entrenchment theory has
several testable implications.
The remainder of this paper
focuses on these implications
and studies the evolution of a
takeover and where losses
occur. If second order effects
are ignored (such as the
market reacting to bidder A
because it expects bidder A to
sweeten its bid in response to
bidder B’s bid), market
reactions to bids as a function
of the value of the bid versus
the market perception of the
true value of the target can be
viewed. This allows us to
study the bidding contest by
focusing on the wealth effects
of the all contestants including
winners and losers. This
article examines these excess
returns to study the evolution
of the bidding contest and the
winner’s curse and managerial
entrenchment theories. 
Empirical Design
Based upon the above
discussion, two types of
bidders emerge: those who try
to maximize shareholder
market value and those who
try to maximize manager
market value. These two
groups are characterized by
whether the maximum price
they are willing to pay is less
or more than the acquisition is
worth to the company’s
shareholders. 
One group of bidders who
we name shareholder wealth
maximizers (SWM) will make
an initial bid below the true
value of the target company to
the acquiring shareholders,
i.e., the size of premium is less
than the expected value of
synergy. If the expected
synergy is large, the first
bidder is able to offer a
preemptive bid in order to
deter rival bids and succeed to
acquire the target company. In
other words, even with a large
premium, the acquisition can
yield positive returns for the
acquiring company. As
existing evidence indicates
bidders more often experience
negative returns on acquisition
announcements, however, this
is not necessarily the case. If
the first bid is not preemptive
and the acquisition is expected
to create a realistic synergy, it
is likely to be contested.
Competitors will not sit idly
while the acquiring company
attempts to generate synergies
at their expense. Executives of
competing companies fear
losing the market after a
competitor makes a move.8
When a bidding contest
occurs, the SWM is most likely
to walk away from the deal
rather than raising the bid
above the target’s true value
and incur losses in shareholder
wealth.
Another group of bidders
who we name manager wealth
maximizers (MWM) drive
bidding decisions based on
managerial rents. Management
entrenchment is more
important than the goal of
shareholder wealth
maximization during a
takeover campaign. They can
choose one of two strategies:
One strategy is to offer a
preemptive initial bid to deter
other potential bidders from
bidding and succeed to acquire
the target company; another
strategy is to start with a low
bid and raise it only in
response to rival bids. The
latter strategy is again likely to
induce rival bid(s). When
competing bids emerge and a
bidding contest ensues, the
first bidder may have to offer
a bid higher than the
preemptive bid in the first
strategy in order to win the
contest, which we suspect
happens in the takeover
market. Once a bidding
contest occurs, it easily leads
to overbidding. Managers’ ego
and enthusiasm built up
during negotiations and large
costs of bidding preparation
(although they are sunk costs)
prevent them from walking
away from the deal.
Substantial information and
other costs of bidding might
make it preferable to bid high
initially to deter other bidders
rather than waiting until they
too incur the costs of bidding
and be forced to bid still
higher. Consequently, the
winning bid premium in
contested bids may be larger
than the one in uncontested
bids and winners involved in
contested bids, on average,
experience significantly more
negative returns. Therefore,
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preemptive initial bids may not
be the result of an irrational
failure to anticipate the
winner’s curse or manager’s
hubris and exaggerated self-
confidence, but an efficient
strategic behavior to minimize
the loss of shareholder market
value.
If the winner’s curse, due
to the effect of managerial
rent-seeking behavior,
dominates the wealth effect of
acquisitions, the following
implications are expected to
occur. First, losses occur for
winners both in uncontested
and contested bids, but the
magnitude of losses will differ.
At the announcement of initial
bids, bidders in contested
acquisitions experience smaller
losses than bidders in
uncontested bids where they
bid high to discourage rival
bids. If preemptive bidding is
an efficient strategy, however,
eventual winners in contested
bid cases would experience
larger total losses than winners
in uncontested bids. Second,
the type of returns that losers
experience will depend on
what type of bidders prevails.
If MWM initially start out with
low bids and raise them only
in response to competitive
bids, then for there to be a
sizable managerial rent-seeking
behavior, the losing bidder
must also have bid above the
true value and should
experience positive returns
when the winning bid is
determined and the market
realizes it will not make the
negative net present value
acquisition. On the other hand,
if SWM withdraw from the
contest once the bid goes
above the true value of target,
losing bidders may well
experience zero or even
negative returns when the
winning bid is determined.
The four points in a
bidding contest in which
changes occur are the date of
the initial bid (which may be
the only bid), the date a
second (or later) bidder enters
with a competing bid, the date
a bidder sweetens its existing
bid, and the date the final
winner is determined. To study
the price adjustment process
we focus on excess returns
about these four points.
Data and Methodology
The sample analyzed in
this study contains firms
engaged in acquisitions during
the period 1986-2000.9 The
sample was obtained by
searching the COMPUSTAT
Industrial Research File for all
delistings caused by tender
offers during the period. Other
criteria used for selection of
data were as follows: 1. Data
availability of all contestants
on the CRSP files; 2. Firms
with concurrent major
corporate events such as
capital structure changes,
divestiture, or other takeover
activities in the period one
month prior to the announce-
ment to the date that the
contest ended were not
included in the final sample.
Application of the above data
requirements resulted in a final
sample of 261 acquisition
events. Next, all acquisitions
that had at least two
competing bidders were
selected based on The Wall
Street Journal Index and
relevant articles in The Wall
Street Journal. This procedure
produced a subsample of 71
acquisitions. Five of them
involved three competing
bidders, while the remainder
involved two bidders. Several
sample acquisitions involved a
fierce bidding war with many
sweetened bids. 
The authors studied the
bidding process by examining
excess returns to initial
bidders. Following Dodd and
Warner (1983), standard
market model residuals are
employed to measure average
abnormal rates of return and Z
statistics. Next these returns
are divided into returns around
bids that were later contested
(N = 71) and returns around
bids that went uncontested (N
= 190). Then, for contested
bids, we examine returns to
both winners and losers
around 1) the entry of a
second (or later bidder), 2) the
sweetening of a bid, and 3) the
date when the bidding contest
ends and the winner is known. 
Empirical Results 
Panel A in Table 1
presents the two-day average
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Table 1
Panel A: Daily average abnormal returns (AR) and Z-values for all initial bids (N = 261), those bids
that go uncontested (N = 190), and those bids that later face competition (N = 71)
Event
Day
All Bids Uncontested Bids Contested Bids
AR(%) Z-value AR(%) Z-value AR(%) Z-value
-1  -1.03  -4.92*  -1.26  -7.83*  -0.63  -2.11**
0  -0.42  -2.45*  -0.51  -4.11*  -0.22 -1.16
-1 to 0  -1.45  -4.74*  -1.77  -8.47*  -0.85  -2.56*
Panel B: Daily average abnormal returns (AR) around the initial bid date for two groups of bids that
later face competition, one group that eventually won the contest (N = 21), and another group that
eventually lost the contest (N = 50)
 Event Day
Bidders who won Bidders who lost
 AR(%)  Z-value  AR(%)  Z-value
-1 -2.37 -3.37*  0.11 0.36
0 -0.65 -1.25 -0.04 0.49
-1 to 0  -3.02  -3.21*   0.07  0.48
* significant at the 0.01 level
** significant at the 0.05 level
abnormal returns and Z-values
around all initial bids. As can
be seen in the first section of
the table the returns are 
-1.45% (Z = -4.74). These
significantly negative returns
are consistent with the
findings of recent studies. The
next two sections of Panel A
divide returns into those bids
that went uncontested and
those that later faced
competition. Bidders that
ended up with no competition
had substantially greater
losses than those that later
faced competition (-1.77% vs.
-0.85%). Although they are
still negative, contested
bidders earn much less
negative returns. The
difference in returns between
these two groups is significant
at the 0.05 level.
Undoubtedly the market is
reacting to the size of the bid
in relation to the market view
of the value of the target to
the bidder. Accordingly, it
clearly reveals that a bid is
more likely to be contested if
the bid is low. The higher the
bid the lower the real returns
to the bidder and the less
likely a higher competing bid,
thus the more negative the
market reaction. 
As an additional insight
into this different market
reaction, we compare the size
of the initial premium between
these two groups. The bid
premium is calculated as the
ratio of the difference between
the bid price specified in the
offer and the target’s market
price 14 days prior to the
announcement date of this
same stock price.
Approximately 65 percent of
the sample used cash
payments and the remaining
35 percent used stock
exchanges. For the stock
exchange sample, we
determine the offer price
based on the bidder’s stock
price 14 days prior to the
announcement date and on the
exchange ratio specified in the
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offer between the two firms.
We find that the initial
premium from uncontested
(pre-emptive) bids is
significantly higher than those
from contested initial bids.
The mean and median
premiums for the entire
sample were 47 percent and
44 percent, respectively. The
mean and median premiums
for the uncontested group are
51 percent and 50 percent,
respectively, whereas they are
38 percent and 37 percent for
the contested group. This
significant difference in bid





low bids) are offered by both
SWM and MWM. If contested
bids are offered solely by
SWM, we would expect to
observe positive
announcement returns because
their bids are below the zero
net present value point.
However, the result that
contested bidders overall earn
negative returns implies that
some contested bids are
offered by MWM. These bids
may be contested either
because MWM adopt a ratchet
bidding strategy in which they
start with relatively low initial
bids or because rival bidders
draw higher managerial rents.
Because the maximum price
that MWM are willing to pay
is definitely higher than the
one of SWM, their initial bids
are likely above the zero net
present value point although
they are contested and thus
result in negative returns. 
The group that ended up
with no competition and
incurred the greatest losses is
of particular interest. The
greatest losses simply imply
that uncontested bidders are
predominantly MWM, as we
expected. This group
undoubtedly draws a
particularly high estimate of
target value probably because
of high managerial rents.
However, it had no reason to
bid close to that estimate and
much above the true value of
the target unless it was to
(successfully as it turned out)
deter other potential bidders.
It is important to note,
though, that while
uncontested bidders bid high
and had the largest wealth
losses, contested bidders may
well incur additional losses if
they are forced to sweeten
their bids later in order to win
the contest.
We gain further insight
into causes of the overbidding
by dividing contested bids into
those that eventually won and
those that eventually lost.




significant negative returns of




of 0.07% (Z = 0.48). The
results that the negative
returns are confined to
eventual winners and that
eventual losers presumably bid
below the zero net present
value point are consistent with
our prediction. Both SWM and
MWM may offer low bids, but
when they face competition,
MWM are likely to sweeten
their bids (but they may not
be able to win the contest if a
rival bid who is also MWM
draws a higher managerial
rents) whereas SWM would
withdraw rather than raising
their bids and destroying
shareholder value.
Accordingly, we conclude that
the eventual winners are
undoubtedly MWM whereas
the eventual losers are mixed
with SWM and MWM. 
We now turn to an
analysis of the additional gains
and losses that occur as the
bidding contest evolves. Table
2 reports the abnormal returns
around the time when a
second (or later) bidder enters
the contest with a new
competing bid. If an early bid
was low and if the target has a
greater value to a late entry
bidder because of greater
synergies, it should be possible
for the late bidder to bid
above the early bid but still
receive positive returns.
However, if the target has a
greater value to the late entry
bidder because of greater
managerial rents, the later
bidder should realize
significant negative returns. 
As seen in Panel A, the
two-day returns to late entry
bidders are strongly negative -
2.82% (Z = -6.16) indicating
a very high probability of
overbidding. Our earlier
interpretation of the negative
returns to contested initial
bidders is that they include
MWM whose bids are above
the zero return point. This
may implicitly indicate that
many of late entry bidders are
also MWM and they outbid 
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TABLE 2 
Panel A: Daily average abnormal returns (AR) for early-entry bidders (N = 81) and late-entry bidders
(N = 76) on the date that the late-entry bidder enters the contest
Event 
Day
All Bids Uncontested Bids
AR(%) Z-value AR(%) Z-value
-1 -1.63 -4.84* 0.23 0.79
0 -1.19 -3.91* 0.15 0.53
-1 to 0 -2.82 -6.16* 0.38 1.17
Panel B: Daily average abnormal returns for late-entry bidders who eventually won the contest (N =
50), and late-entry bidders who eventually lost the contest (N = 26) on the date that the late-entry
bidder enters the contest
Event 
Day
Late-entry bidder is final winner Late-entry bidder is final loser
 AR(%)  Z-value  AR(%)  Z-value
-1 -1.84 -5.73* -1.22 -1.36
0 -1.47 -4.92* -0.65 -0.63
-1 to 0 -3.31 -6.95* -1.87 -1.76***
* significant at the 0.01 level *** significant at the 0.10 level
the initial bids because of
greater managerial rents. 
On the other hand, market
reaction to first bidders is
insignificantly positive: The
two- day returns are 0.38% (Z
= 1.17). This zero return can
be explained by our
proposition that initial bidders
are mixed with MWM and
SWM, and by our earlier
finding that the market sorts
out eventual winners or losers
at the announcement of initial
bids and reacts differently to
those two groups. If all
contested initial bidders are
MWM and they are losers in
the bidding, we expect to find
that their returns would be
significantly positive given the
large negative returns on
announcement of their initial
bids. If the market expects 
that they will continue to
ratchet up the bids, however,
they would sustain bigger
losses. On the other hand,
contested initial bidders also
include SWM who we expect
will realize negative or zero
returns when they face
competition and lower
winning probabilities.
Different wealth effects for
four different types of bids,
MWM-Winner, MWM-Loser,
SWM-Winner, and SWM-
Loser, offset each other
resulting in zero returns. In
addition, returns to early
bidders may be lower because
the market is simultaneously
evaluating the possibility that
the early bidders (most likely
MWM) will sweeten their bids
in response to the competing
bids.
When returns to late entry
bidders are divided into those
who eventually won and those
who eventually lost, results in
Panel B show that both are
negative but eventual winners
are more significantly
negative. The two-day returns
are -3.31% (Z = -6.95) for the
final winners and -1.87% (Z = 
-1.76) for the final losers. As
with initial bids, we find that
negative returns to late-entry
bidders are largely due to
eventual winners. This is
because the eventual winner’s
bid is high and the market can
correctly sort out high bids
(that are eventual winners)
from low bids (that are
eventual losers). As mentioned
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above, a late entry bidder can
outbid the early bid when the
target has a greater value to
the late entry bidder either
because of greater synergies or
greater managerial rents. The
negative returns for both
eventual winners and losers
indicate that the source of
value is most likely managerial
rents.
When a rival bid emerges,
more than half of the first
bidders in our sample
withdrew from the contest
without sweetening their bid.
The remaining less than one
half of first bidders sweetened
their initial bid in response to
the competing bid. We select a
group of the bidders who
sweetened their bids at least
once in response to rival bids.
Among the 32 sample
acquisitions that experienced
at least sweetened bids, most
contests ended with one or
two sweetened bids, but some
acquisitions involved many
sweetened bids. A total of 48
bidders sweetened their bids
61 times. Returns around the
announcements of a sweetened
bid are given in Panel A in
Table 3. The two-day returns
for the bidder who sweetened
its bid are –0.96% (Z = 
-1.45). Although they are still
negative, the returns are not
statistically significant. 
First, it should be noted
that these returns are in
addition to the negative return
to the sweetener’s earlier bid.
Second, there tends to be only
modest sweetening. These
bidders are merely trying to
raise their bid to top
competition in an incremental
fashion as we hypothesize that
they adopt a ratchet style
bidding strategy. This modest
sweetening of bids could also
be interpreted in terms of the
signaling models. If there are
substantial costs of bid
revision, bidders are
motivated to bid high to deter
other bidders from revising
their bids and incurring these
costs. If bidding costs are
largely up-front costs of
seeking information and
revisions of bids are
essentially costless, it would
be difficult to deter other
bidders so optimal bid
sweetening strategy would
seem to be bid incrementally
above the rival bid. 
The negative but very
insignificant returns to other
contestants also seem to
indicate that the sweetened
bid is not high enough to
allow the market to sort out
winners and losers. Also it
may indicate that other
contestants have just bid high
enough that winning or losing
will not have a material effect
on their shareholders.
Alternatively the insignificant
returns may simply be because
the market is simultaneously
evaluating the reduced
probability of these other
contestants’ winning and the
increased probability that they
will sweeten their bid in
response to the other
contestants’ sweetened bid. In
sum, sweetening a bid does
not have a significant effect on
shareholder value. Most
impact occurs on the initial
announcements for both early
bidders and late bidders.
Among the 61 sweetened
bids offered by 48 bidders, 37
bids were made by eventual
winners whereas 24 bids were
made by eventual losers. It
would be interesting to
compare the market reactions
to these two groups. Results in
Panel B show that the two-day
returns around the announce-
ments of a sweetened bid are 
-1.55% (Z = -1.58) for the
final winners and -0.68% (Z =
-0.31) for the final losers.
Although both returns are not
statistically significant, the
difference between the two
groups is significant. It is not
surprising that eventual
winners sweeten their bids
more aggressively and the
market reacts accordingly.
A majority of initial
bidders withdraw when they
faced a competing bid. When a
rival bid emerges, we argue
that first bidders who
withdraw immediately are
mostly SWM and that first
bidders who sweeten their bid
are mostly MWM. Late
bidders who sweeten their
bids are also mostly MWM.
For a further investigation of
how the market reacts to the
end of contests among MWM,
we examine returns around
the date the winner and the
loser are determined after a
bidding war. Because they are
assumed to be MWM, we
expect that the losers in this
type of contest will experience
positive returns when they are
forced out from making value-
destroying investments. For
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TABLE 3
Panel A: Daily average abnormal returns for bidders who sweetened their bids (N = 61) and other
contestants (N = 72) on the date that one bidder sweetened its bid
 Event Day
Bidders who sweetened their bid Other contestants
 AR(%)  Z-value  AR(%)  Z-value
-1 -0.75 -1.59 0.15 0.92
0 -0.21 0.74 0.09 0.31
-1 to 0 -0.96 -1.45 0.24 0.38
Panel B: Among the 61 sweetened bids, 37 bids were made by eventual winners whereas 24 bids were
made by eventual losers. Daily average abnormal returns to these two groups of bidders on the date
that one bidder sweetened its bid
 Event Day
Sweetened bids by eventual winner Sweetened bids by eventual loser
 AR(%)  Z-value  AR(%)  Z-value
-1 -0.97 -1.53 -0.49 -0.64
0 -0.58 -1.12  -0.19 -0.22
-1 to 0 -1.55 -1.40 -0.68 -0.31
Panel C: Daily average abnormal returns around the date the winner and the loser are determined after
a bidding war. The sample includes 14 cases where The Wall Street Journal article clearly indicates the
emergence of a winner and a loser.
 Event Day
Winner Loser
 AR(%)  Z-value  AR(%)  Z-value
-1 -1.27 -1.64 1.31 1.92***
0 -0.51 -0.91 0.31 1.23
-1 to 0 -1.78 -1.51 1.62 1.89***
*** significant at the 0.10 level
this investigation, we select as
the sub-sample only those
cases where The Wall Street
Journal article clearly indicates
the emergence of a winner and
a loser. This is illustrated in
the example of the February
15, 1994, issue of The Wall
Street Journal:
Viacom Inc. appeared






required to win the
contest, … ,win its
bidding rival QVC…
Yesterday, QVC stock
rose $1.625 to $48.50
a share ... while
Viacom Class B
nonvoting shares fell
$1.75 a share to
$29.875... Both stocks
moved in
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response to QVC’s
Sunday statement,
which read like a
concession of defeat.
The two-day average
abnormal returns for winners
and losers in14 acquisitions
are shown in Panel C. The
loser’s returns are significantly
positive while the winner’s
returns are insignifi-cantly
negative. The two-day
abnormal return for the loser
is 1.62% (Z = 1.89), in
contrast to the return for the
winner, which is -1.78% (Z = 
-1.51). These results clearly
indicate that the losers bid
over the zero net present value
point, so the market reacts
positively when they fail to
acquire the target company.
On the other hand, it appears
the winner has bid high
enough that the acquisition is
not a matter of significance to
its shareholders. 
Finally, Table 4 reports
the cumulative sum of the
daily average abnormal return
for winners and losers from
the date that they enter the
corporate control contest (date
of opening bid for the initial
bidder and date of subsequent
competing bid for the late-
entry bidder) to the date that
the contest is over and the
winner is known. The results
show that the group of
winners has a significantly
negative return of -2.51
percent, while the group of
losers has an insignificant
positive return of 0.23
percent. As we hypothesized,
the size of negative return for
the winners in contested bids
is larger than the negative
return for the winners in
uncontested bidders. Because
some significant corporate
events may occur during the
time period from the opening
bid until the contest is over, 
the cumulative returns may be
contaminated to some extent.
However, the overall results
are consistent with our
prediction. The fact that
eventual winners in contested




bidding is an efficient strategic
behavior to minimize the loss
of shareholder market value.
TABLE 4
CUMULATIVE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR)




*** significant at the 0.10 level
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Summary 
One of the most
controversial issues in the
takeover market is why
companies continue to make
acquisitions despite a clear
evidence of failure to create
value for investors. Failure of
synergy explanations of large
premiums paid to target
companies have led academics
and practitioners to seek the
answer from individual
motives of the decision maker,
i.e., corporate executives. This
paper argues that there are
two types of acquirers,
shareholder wealth maximizers
(SWM) and manager wealth
maximizers (MWM), and the
latter type of acquirers whose
decisions are driven by
management entrenchment
might explain the overbidding
and consequent losses.
Managers develop firm-
specific human capital over
time, and thus their value to
the firm becomes higher than
their labor market value. By
choosing to invest in projects
that need their expertise and
private information, managers
can maximize their firm-
specific human capital and
managerial rents. Acquisitions
are a type of investments that
allow managers to effectively
increase the rents. Therefore,
this theory implies that
executives who expect to
derive large managerial rents
are willing to pay more than
the target’s true value to their
shareholders.
Because SWM and MWM
are characterized by whether
or not they include managerial
rents in the value of target,
their bidding behaviors are
differentiated in terms of
whether their initial bids are
below the true value of target
company and whether they
sweeten their bid in response
of rival bids. SWM bid initially
below the true value of target.
If the bid is not preemptive
and the acquisition creates a
realistic synergy, however, it
is likely to be contested by
competitors. When a bidding
contest occurs, the SWM is
most likely to walk away from
the deal rather than raising the
bid above the zero net present
value point and destroy
shareholder wealth. On the
other hand, MWM who drive
bidding decisions based on
managerial rents find that a
preemptive initial bid to deter
other potential bidders is an
efficient strategy to minimize
loss of shareholder wealth.
MWM who start with a low
bid and raise it only if needed
to outbid a competing bid may
realize more losses. 
We first examine market
reactions to announcements of
two types of initial bids: one
group that are later to face
competition and another group




returns than contested bids.
This implies that bidders bid
high, not because of a high
synergies but to signal a high
valuation due to managerial
rents and deter competing
bids. Similarly the (smaller)
negative returns that do occur
around contested initial bids
are due to bidders that are
eventual winners. Again this
seems to indicate that when
low bids are contested, SWM
walk away whereas MWB
sweeten their bids to win the
contest. It seems to indicate
that markets can quite
accurately distinguish eventual
winning bids from other bids
(presumably by their size) and
penalize eventual winners
accordingly.
Next we investigate the
extent and direction of change
in value of all contestants in
contested bids around the
announcement of competing
bids and sweetened bids. We
find that competing bidders
suffer significant loss when
they enter corporate control
contests, and somewhat
smaller losses when they
sweeten their bids during the
contest. On the other hand,
other contestants earn normal
rates of return during those
periods. Sweetening a bid does
not have a significant effect on
shareholder value. Most
impact occurs on the initial
announcements for both early
bidders and late bidders. For a
further investigation of how
the market reacts to the end of
contests among MWM, we
select a group of the bidders
who sweetened their bids at
least once in response to rival
bids and examine returns
around the date the winning
bid is finally determined. We
assume that SWM will
withdraw once their bids are
contested. For this group, our
results show that the losing
bidders gain significantly
positive returns when they are
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forced out from the contest, as
we predicted. These results
are consistent with our
characterization of two types
of bidders, SWM and MWM.
Finally, we examine the
cumulative sum of the daily
average abnormal return for
winners and losers from the
date that they enter the
corporate control contest (date
of opening bid for the initial
bidder and date of subsequent
competing bid for the late-
entry bidder) to the date that
the contest is over and the
winner is known. The size of
negative return for the
winners in contested bids is
larger than the negative return
for the winners in uncontested
bidders. The fact that eventual
winners in contested bids
suffer larger negative returns
than uncontested winners
confirm our hypothesis:
Preemptive initial bidding is
an efficient strategic behavior
to minimize the loss of
shareholder market value.
Endnotes
1. Abnormal returns to
acquiring companies have
been found to be zero to
negative (Jarrell, Brickley, and
Netter, 1988; Berkovitch and
Narayanan, 1993).
2. To determine whether
acquisitions are profitable
investments for acquiring
firms, many studies have
examined acquiring firm’s
long-term performance trends
for a period after acquisition.
There are two approaches
employed in the existing
literature to measure the long-
term performance. The first
group of studies examine
acquiring firms’ stock returns
over a period following the
acquisition completion. Many
studies find that acquiring
firms experience negative
abnormal returns following the
acquisition (Magenheim and
Mueller, 1988; Loderer and
Martin, 1992; Agrawal, Jaffe,
and Mandelker, 1992). The
second approach directly
assesses the combined firm’s
performance using accounting
data. According to Fowler and
Schmidt (1988) Ravenscraft
and Scherer (1987), and
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback
(1992, 1997), acquiring
firms’ accounting rate of
returns and profitability after
acquisitions either deteriorate
or show little improvement. 
3. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback
(1997) report that premiums
significantly affect acquisition
performance.
4. Whether or not bidders use
such strategies to compensate
for the winner’s curse is still
an open question. Studies of
experimental auctions indicate
there is a partial but not full
correction so winners can still
be expected to suffer losses.
Also they show that the
winner’s curse persists with
experience though the
magnitude and frequency of
losses decline with sufficient
experience and feedback
regarding the outcomes of
decisions (see Kagel and Levin,
1986, Kagel, Levin, Battalio,
and Meyer, 1989, Dyer, Kagel
and Levin, 1989, Hansen and
Lott, 1991, and Lind and
Plott, 1991). However,
evidence in real world cases is
inconclusive. Capen, Clapp,
and Campbell (1971), who
coined the term winner’s
curse, argued that it explained
the low profits earned by oil
companies on offshore oil tract
auctions in the 1960's. But
subsequent studies have
rejected this conclusion
showing that bidders earn




5. Another way to reduce
bidder risk in a common value
context is to move away from
all-cash payment to some form
of contingent payment scheme
like stock payment. Then,
some of the risk associated
with the transaction could be
eliminated. If the winner’s
curse causes the low or
negative returns to bidders,
stock-offering bidders should
suffer no or less loss than
cash-paying bidders. However,
empirical studies find the
opposite result: stock-paying
bidders earn lower returns
than cash-paying bidders (for
example, see Travlos, 1989).
6. The prototype example of
the theory is a secretary who
becomes invaluable by
rearranging a filing system to
suit her own idiosyncratic
search patterns (Edlin and
Stiglitz, 1995).
7. Actually these models
obtain an equilibrium in the
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absence of costs but it is a
weak equilibrium and as
Bhattacharyya (1992) shows
even an infinitesimal cost will
make this equilibrium
dominant.
8. Noe and Rebello (1997)
argue that this is especially
true in fast-changing
industries.
9. The first draft of this article
was written in 2004.
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